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Editorial
Ethical issues surrounding the study of nocebo
effects: Recommendations for deceptive research
Background
The nocebo effect has been described as the flip side to the placebo effect, whereby an
adverse reaction is experienced by someone who receives an inert exposure (Kennedy,
1961). An inert exposure in this context is a substance or procedure that has no active
medicinal or physiological properties able to directly influence the symptom experience
in the receiver. Nocebo effects seem to primarily occur due to negative expectations
(Webster, Weinman, & Rubin, 2016) and are commonly encountered in clinical practice
(Colloca & Miller, 2011).
Experimental nocebo research commonly involves some element of deception by
misleading participants about the nature of the experimental stimulus. Such procedures
are often essential – informing participants that the stimulus is inert may dramatically
change their expectations of side effects and hence their subsequent symptom
experience. This reliance on deception raises a number of ethical concerns, not least in
terms of informed consent. Due to concerns about these potential negative effects,
deception is not always received favourably by institutional ethics review boards, making
nocebo effects notoriously difficult to study. However, whilst the adverse ethical
implications of deceptive studies are a concern, the costs of not conducting deceptive
research should also be considered. Nocebo effects are one of the underlyingmechanisms
for the development of non-specific side effects tomedications (Barsky, Saintfort, Rogers,
& Borus, 2002). In their recent overview, Benedetti and Shaibani (2018) note the
importance of understanding nocebo effects as something different from placebo effects,
explaining that more research is needed to understand these nocebo-induced side effects
which may prove crucial in controlling treatment adherence and therefore patient
outcomes.
In addition, many nocebo researchers still claim that their participants provide
informed consent for their studies, when logically this cannot be the case if they are
deceived as to the nature of the exposure. For example, in a systematic review conducted
by our team, the majority of studies incorrectly explained that participants gave informed
consent (Webster, Weinman, & Rubin, 2016). Therefore, further discussion around these
issues is clearly warranted.
This editorial provides an overview of what deception is, the current guidelines for
using deception, and its effects. We include recommendations for deceptive research and
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draw upon an example of a recent study conducted by our team. Although these
suggestions will not resolve all ethical issues relating to nocebo research, they may help
researchers navigate some of the key issues involved in this field.
What counts as deception?
There is no one agreed definition of deception. Hey (1998) explains there is a difference
betweenwithholding information fromparticipants and telling them thewrong thing; it is
the latter which counts as deception. However, more recently, others have taken a
broader view and include violations of participants’ default assumptions in their definition
of deception. For example, according to Pierce (2008), withholding information can
result in participants forming false beliefs about a study. Therefore, perhaps a more
appropriate definition of deception in research is that which intentionally allows
participants to have, or maintain, a belief that the investigator knows is not true.
Current guidelines for using deception
Although discouraged, deception is not ‘banned’ in social science research. The British
Psychological Society (BPS) allows withholding information from participants in
exceptional circumstances to preserve the research integrity (BPS, 2009). This is not a
carte blanche for researchers, however. Additional requirements stipulate deception
should only be used if: (1) There are no other effective procedures to obtain the desired
results; (2) the research has a strong scientific merit; (3) there is an appropriate risk
management and harm alleviation strategy; and (4) when deception is revealed, it is
unlikely to lead to discomfort, anger, or objections from participants (BPS, 2014). The
code also requires that participants can withdraw at any time and are debriefed as soon
and as sensitively as possible after the study. In addition, deceptive studies should be
designed to protect the dignity and autonomy of the participants, and withholding of
information should be clearly specified in the protocol that is subjected to ethical review
(BPS, 2014).
The effects of deception
Although allowed by the ethical guidelines, there is a contested trade-off between the
need for deception and the consequences this could have on participants. Evidence,
however, on its effects is mixed. In a review of studies assessing participants’ reactions to
being involved in deception experiments, Christensen (1988) concluded that participants
do not perceive that they have been harmed as a result and do not mind having been
misled. Instead, participants enjoyed the experience more and felt they received more
educational benefit than those who participated in non-deceptive experiments (Chris-
tensen, 1988). Kimmel (1998) also concludes that deception hasminimal negative effects
on participants and that they do not become resentful about being deceived. However, a
more recent reviewbyHertwig andOrtmann (2008) noted that this is not always the case.
For example, participants who have been deceived have been annoyed (Allen, 1983), and
confederates have noted the angry reactions from participants once they find out they
have been deceived (Oliansky, 1991).
There are also broader effects of deception to consider. Deception has been suggested
to affect the reputation of research teams and the discipline of psychology as a whole
(Lawson, 2001). Indeed, studies have shown that deceived participants tend to be more
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suspicious of the truthfulness of experimenters, although this does not seem to affect their
beliefs about psychologists’ trustworthiness in general (Cook et al., 1970). Similarly, no
negative effects have been found on deceived participants’ attitudes towards psycholog-
ical research (Kimmel, 1996; Sharpe, Adair, & Roese, 1992).
The main reason why the evidence is so mixed is because the type of deception varies
between studies (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008). Unless a direct replication, no two studies
deceive their participants in the sameway. It seems logical that different types anddegrees
of deception will have different effects. For example, the BPS notes there is more likely to
be a problem if the deception implies a more benign topic of study than is actually being
carried out. However, in reality, it is hard to predict the effect any type of deception will
have on participants as many studies fail to report how the deception was received by
participants.
Recommendations for deceptive research
Deceptive research, however, is still not risk-free, and researchers should be wary of any
potential deleterious effects. There are various approaches that researchers can take as
precautions. Although widely discussed in the context of reducing nocebo effects in
clinical practice, authorized concealment (Wells & Kaptchuk, 2012), which would
involve deciding what to tell research participants based on their characteristics and
previous experiences, may not be a viable way to inform them about a study. Instead,
some of our suggested approaches originate from placebo research, but can still be
applied in the context of nocebo research as the element of deception is still the same –
participants cannot be informed of the true nature of the exposure (i.e., that it is inert).
1. Patient and public involvement. Action can be taken at the planning and designing
phase of any deceptive study using patient and public involvement (PPI). PPI is
promoted by the National Institute of Health Research and allows researchers to see
through the public’s eyes when designing studies by carrying out research with the
public rather than about them (Involve, 2015). PPI can help make sure the right
research is done, that it is conducted properly, and improve research quality. Using
PPI researchers can talk to the public about their opinions on the use of deception in
an upcoming study. This collaboration could help develop innovativeways to reduce
the degree of deception required and to discuss strategies to help limit any potential
negative effects both during and after the study. In this way, researchers can carry out
their studywith the backing of a separate group of the public that have been involved
in the planning and the design.
2. Authorized deception. Whilst recruiting participants, authorized deception can be
used by informing them that some information will be withheld, inaccurate, or
misleading; deception is necessary for research integrity; the study has been ethically
approved; and they will receive full study details after participation (Wendler & Miller,
2004). This falls short of full informedconsent, but doespromote autonomyby allowing
potential participants to decide if they are willing to participate in a study that involves
deception (Miller & Kaptchuk, 2008). Therefore, participants maintain control over
their participation as their initial consent is conditional on their renewal at the debrief,
where they have the option to withdraw their data (Bortolotti & Mameli, 2006).
There are concerns that informing participants about deception may compromise the
study’s validity almost as much as revealing its true nature and may also hinder
recruitment.However,Martin andKatz (2010) have found that authorized deception does
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not affect the magnitude of placebo effects, recruitment, or retention of participants
compared to non-authorized deception and is preferred to not alerting participants to the
presence of deception. This suggests that the authorized deception is a viable and ethically
preferable alternative consent process for deceptive studies.
In addition, it is worth noting that authorized deception is the process that is currently
used in double-blind clinical trials, often branded as the gold standard research design.
Here, participants are told that they will either get the experimental drug or the placebo;
however, they are openly informed that the information about which drug they are
receiving will be withheld until the end of the trial.
3. Nominated informed consent. A variant on authorized deception is for participants
to nominate a person they trust to receive all the study information (Clarke, 1999).
They can then judge whether it is acceptable and give consent on the participant’s
behalf. It is possible, however, the nomineemay have different values and needs from
the participant and thus may give consent when the participant themselves would
not (Patry, 2001). To address this, Patry (2001) suggests that participants should also
be told: (1) Their participation is voluntary and they can withdraw any time without
consequence; (2) they can get more information (providing it is not necessary to
withhold); (3) they could get false or incomplete information; (4) they will be
completely informed at the study’s conclusion; (5) the duration of the study; (6)what
the study involves; and (7) information about expected risks. This combined with
nominated informed consent provides additional protection to the participant.
4. Debriefing participants. When using deception, most ethics boards require
researchers to debrief their participants. According to BPS guidelines, the debrief
should explain that the need for deceptionwas an essential feature of the study design
and explain the conduct of the experiment. It should be made clear that deception is
only used when no risk of significant harm is present to participants and when
important results are at stake. Participantsmust be debriefed as early as is feasible, but
no later than at the conclusion of the data collection. After debriefing participants
should be allowed to withdraw their data to restore a degree of autonomy, allowing
themnot to contribute to researchwhich theywouldhave declined toparticipate had
they known the true nature of the study (Miller & Kaptchuk, 2008).
5. Assessing and reporting the impact. It is also important for researchers to assess their
use of deception and the strategies they used to limit any negative effects as well as to
report the impact their deception had on participants. Miller and Kaptchuk (2008)
suggest that scientific journals can help this by requiring researchers tobemore explicit
about their use of deception, and what methods they used to negate any potential
deleterious effects. More than this, however, it could be argued that researchers using
deception have a moral obligation to check they have not caused harm, if for no other
reason than to reassure themselves andtheirethicsboard.The requireddebriefingoffers
an opportunity to obtain feedback fromparticipants and should be utilized.Making sure
researchers assess the impact of deception will help to improve the transparency of
deceptive research and the ethical design of future studies.
Our approach
In a recent study by our team, we used authorized deception whilst making sure that
information given toparticipantswas as truthful as possible (Webster,Weinman,&Rubin,
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2018). Our study involved a randomized controlled trial altering patient information
leaflets (PILs) to reduce symptom attribution to a sham medicine (an inert tablet). We
openly informed participants that information would be withheld from them. For
example, theywere toldwe could not reveal the type of tablet to avoid biasing their views
about it and that the difference between the PILs included slight changes to the wording,
to seewhether this influenced their thoughts about the tablet, but thatwecould not reveal
what the changes were. In addition, we correctly described the tablet as ‘a well-known
tablet available without prescription’, and the leaflet was truthful for an inert tablet. For
example, sections about taking toomany tablets explained that this can causemore severe
side effects as noted by Webster, Weinman, & Rubin (2016), whilst all potential side
effects listed the common non-specific side effects reported during a nocebo response
(Wells & Kaptchuk, 2012).
Planning of the studywas discussedwith a PPI panel, to get their input onwhether our
approachwas appropriate and how tominimize any ethical issues still further. In addition,
all participants were debriefed at the end of data collection by informing them of the
purpose of the study and what the tablet was. Participants had the opportunity to
withdraw at this point, upholding their participant autonomy, and any feedback received
from participants following the debrief was collated. No negative effects were found.
Conclusions
Current guidelines include withholding information as deception and allow deception in
psychological research under a strict set of conditions. Evidence from the literature
suggests that criticisms of the potential negative effects of deception are often unfounded.
Nonetheless, maintaining high ethical standards in such a controversial area is important.
We propose a strategy that includes deception by omission whilst still being truthful
where possible, authorized deception and debriefing, together with input from a PPI
panel.
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